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IV

ST A TEMENT OF THE CASI:

Nature of the Case
A jury found Dennis James Garner guilty of battery on. and propelling bodily fluids at, a
detention deputy as he was being booked into jail

Mr. Gamer's theory of the case was that, to

the extent he committed a battery, he \\as merely defending himself against the detention
deputies' unreasonable use of force.

But the court refused to instruct the jury accordingly

because it did not believe there is a right to post-arrest self-defense.

This appeal raises an

apparent issue of first impression in Idaho: Whether an arrestee who is being booked into jail
has a right to defend himself against a detention officer's unreasonable use of force. The answer
to that question is "yes." The right to self-defense. conferred without qualification by the Idaho
Constitution and the common law, if not the U.S. Constitution, does not evaporate after the
individual acting in self-defense is arrested. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
that the U.S. Constitution protects an individual's right to he free from an officer's use of
unreasonable force, regardless of his status as an arrestee, pretrial detainee. or inmate. Finally,
an arrestee should not have to choose betwei:n suffering serious injury or death on the one hand,
and earning a felony conviction and prison term on the other.

This Court should therefore

recognize an arrestee's right to use reasonable force to defend himself against an officer's use of
unreasonable force during the booking process. vacate Mr. Garner's battery conviction, and
remand his case to the district court for a new trial on that charge. 1

1

Mr. Gamer does not challenge his conviction for propelling bodily fluids.

I

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On May 14. 2014. the Boise Police arrested Mr. Garner for public intoxication.
(Tr. Vol. I, 2 p.20, Ls.I I 16; PSI, p.13.) As he was being booked into the Ada County Jail,
Mr. Garner allegedly kicked and spat at a detention deputy. (PSI, pp.20-24.) When the kicking
took place, four officers held Mr. Garner. who was handcuffed, face-dov,n on the ground.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.284, Ls.19-22: Tr. Vol. II, p.28, Ls.13-14 ). Mr. Garner kicked out of the leg-lock
that one of the deputies had him in, and in turn allegedly kicked that deputy. (Tr. Vol. I, p.360,
Ls.10-12; Vol. II., p.35, L.5 - p.36, L.4; p.44, 13-16.) The State later charged Mr. Garner with
battery on, and propelling bodily fluids at. a detention deputy. I.C. §§ 18-915(2), 18-915B;
R., pp.6-7, 34-35, 83-84.
At trial, six detention deputies testified about the incident. 3 They said that Mr. Garner
was increasingly uncooperative as they tried to search him during intake, so they took him to a
holding cell to complete the search. (See. e.g.. Tr. Vol. II.4 p.14. L.6
Deputy Huffaker).)

p. I 5. L.24 (testimony of

As the deputies escorted i\·1r. Garner into the holding cell, Mr. Garner

allegedly spit at Deputy Huffaker (Tr. Vol. IL p.21. Ls.2-9, p.22. L.4 - p.23. L.5, p.25, L.23
p.26, L.24 ). which prompted the deputies to take Mr. Garner to the ground (Tr. Vol.

IL

p.25,

Ls.13-22).
At that point, multiple deputies were trying to control Mr. Garner, who was on his
stomach on a cement slab in the holding cell. ( Tr. Vol. II, p.28. Ls.13-14 ). Deputy Huffaker put
Mr. Garner's legs into a figure-four leg-lock (Tr. Vol. II, p.29, Ls.1-24), Deputy Johnson helped
Deputy Huffaker with Mr. Garner's legs (Tr. Vol. 11, p.31, Ls.5--7), Deputy McKinley was on

2

Volume I contains the first two days of trial (October 20 and 21, 2014) and the sentencing
hearing (December 17, 2014).
3 The court admitted a video of the incident, which was captured by the jail's surveillance
cameras, as State's Exhibit 1. (Tr. Vol. I, p.233, L.16 - p.236, L.3.)

2

Mr. Garner's upper body (Tr. Vol. II, p.30. Ls.20-24, p.73. L.11
Burnett was trying to control Mr. Garner's

(Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls. l

p.74. L.8), and Deputy
). Around that time,

Deputy Lusby heard Mr. Gamer making ·'guttural-type noises" and say things like "I can't
breathe," and "get your hands off me." (Tr. Vol. L p.446, Ls.8-15.) Deputy Burnett remembers
Mr. Garner saying "[g]et off my fucking back.'" (Tr. Vol. L p.189, Ls.20-22.)

Mr. Garner

eventually kicked out of the leg lock and hit Deputy Huffaker, after which Officer Huffaker tased
Mr. Garner. (Tr. Vol. II, p.35. L.5

p.36, L.4. p.46, L.11 -p.49. L.1.)

At the close of the evidence, the court took up Mr. Gamer's proposed self-defense
instruction. That instruction provides:
An officer is not permitted to use unreasonable or excessive force [in
making or attempting to make an arrest] [in detaining or attempting to detain a
person for questioning].
If an officer does use unreasonable or excessive force [in making or
attempting to make an arrest] [in detaining or attempting to detain a person for
questioning], the person being [arrested] [detained] may lawfully use reasonable
force to protect himself.
The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that the officer did not usc unreasonable force. or
(2) if the officer used unreasonable force. that the defendant used
unreasonable force in response.
If the state fails to do so. you must find the defendant not guilty [of
[Resisting][,] [Delaying] [or] [Obstructing] an Officer].
(R., p.76; Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction (.. IC.JI'') 1263.) Defense counsel acknowledged that
the instruction, \vhich he took verbatim from the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, would need to
be modified to fit the facts of this case. (Tr. Vol. I. p.213, Ls.I 25.)
The State objected to the proposed instruction, explaining that (1) the officers involved
were detention officers, not peace officers or public officers as defined by statute (Tr. Vol. I,
p.461, L.3 - p.462, L.2); (2) the altercation took place while Mr. Garner was being booked into
jail, not while the officers attempted to arrest or detain him (Tr. Vol. I, p.460, L.12 - p.461, L.2;

4

Volume II contains the third day of trial (October 23, 2014).
3

Vol. II, p.127, L.12 - p.128. L.1); (3) there was no evidence that Mr. Gamer was scared or
the officers used against him
-p.127,

10,p.128,

p.]

unreasonable (

I.

II, p. l

p.130. L5); and (4)

Ls.8-15, p.1 26
instruction \Vas

irrelevant and would be distracting, confusing. and misleading (Tr. Vol. IL p.126, Ls.16-22,
p.127, Ls.10-11). 5
Mr. Gamer argued that ( 1) the right to defend oneself against excessive force is grounded
in the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions, not in statute, and so it docs not matter whether the officers
·were peace officers or detention officers (Tr. Vol. II, p.124, Ls.18-24, p. l

L6

p.126. L.5);

(2) that right did not evaporate after he \Vas arrested or detained (Tr. Vol. fl, p.125. Ls.2-24,
p.131, Ls.18-23 ); (3) there was sufficient e\ idence to support the instruction, including the
testimony that Mr. Garner said "I can't breathe" during the altercation (Tr. Vol. II, p.129, Ls.I
22, p.130, L.21

p.131, L 1); and (4) the instruction was extremely relevant to Mr. Garner's

defense and would not distract the jury (Tr. Vol IL p.131, Ls.2-17).
The district court acknowledged that an officer testifo:d that Mr. Garner said "I can't
breathe" (Tr. VoL II, p.130, Ls.6-20), but reasoned that (1) the instruction applied only to peace
officers or public officers, not detention officers (Tr. Vol. II, p.132, Ls. I-I 7), and (2) the case
referenced in the model jury instruction. ,\tali! v. Spurr, 114 Idaho 277, 279 (Ct. App. 1988),
addressed only force used during arrests and detentions, not force used after a defendant was
already in custody (Tr. Vol. II, p.132. L.1

p.134, L.12). The court explained:

In this case the court wants to first briefly address the original comment on
Tuesday from [the State]. In this case, although [ICJI] 1263, the one that is being
5

The State also argued that, if the court were to give the instruction, it should instruct the jury
that the instruction should only be considered with respect to the lesser included charge of
resisting and obstructing, and not the battery charge. (Tr. Vol. II, p.128, L.8 - p.129, L.12.) The
court did not reach that issue. (Tr. Vol. II, p. I 31, L.25 - p.134, L.21.) As demonstrated by the
analysis below, however, the self-defense instruction is warranted with respect to both the
battery and resisting and obstructing charges.

4

asked to be given to the jury in this case concerning the use of
force,
does not specifically use the \Vord "peace officer."
Nonetheless, in the "Comments" second, it does refer the court or refer to
[ICJI] I 264 where the definition of public or peace officer is contained.
And as we had talked about previously concerning the request for the
instruction on resisting and obstructing an officer, there is a distinction between a
peace officer and a detention officer statutorily.
The court would also note and it does agree with the state here that the
Spurr case, which is cited in the comments section which the defense is relying
on, did indeed simply involve a situation of either an attempted arrest or certainly
an attempt to detain a defendant for questioning.
And the cases. as lthe State] has correctly noted. relied upon in the Spurr
decision, all dealt with the use of force during an arrest. And there was no
authority of which I \Vas aware oL appellate authority, that talks about this
instruction being given in the case or someone being in a detention facility,
whether in a correctional facility or a county detention or correctional facility
there.
The court agrees that the /-,JJWT court did indicate that a person has a
constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force by officers in the
performance of their duties. But having said that, the instruction itself contains
two alternatives for the court as to how a jury could be instructed, either that an
officer is not permitted to use unreasonable or excessive force in making or
attempting to make an arrest. or in detaining or attempting to detain a person for
questioning.
And, again, this language is consistent with the decision in Spurr, which is
one of those situations where it was either an arrest or certainly an attempt to
detain an individual for questioning.
Considered as a whole, the court does not find, based upon the case
authority, that in Spurr the appellate court intended to have the defense applied so
broadly as to encompass individuals vd10 are in a correctional or detention
facility.
And, therefore, because the instruction sought in this case is applied to
either arrests or detention for questioning and because neither one of those things
applied in this case, I do not believe it is appropriate to give the requested
instruction number 1263, and I will not do so then at this time.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.132, Ll

p.134, L.12.)

The jury found Mr. Garner guilty of both charges (Tr. Vol. II, p.219. L.7
and Mr. Gamer timely appealed (R., pp.146-48 ).

5

p.220, L.5),

ISSUE
district court commit reversible error

rejecting

6

Garner's

self-defense

ARGUMENT
The District Court Committed Reversibk Error By Rejectinu Mr. Garner·s Proposed Self.Defense Instruction
Introduction
The district court erred when it found that an arrestee being booked into jail 6 has no right
to defend himself against a detention deputy·s use of unreasonable or excessive force. The cow1
mistakenly limited its analysis to ICJI 1263 and Spurr, without considering defense counsel's
argument that an individual, regardless of his status within the criminal justice system, has a
right to be free from, and use reasonable force to defend against. an officer's use of excessive
force. Indeed, there is no meaningful difference between a police officer's use of excessive force
during an arrest and a detention deputy's use of force after the arrest. In either situation, the
arrestee does not have to choose between suffering serious injury or death on the one hand, and
earning a felony conviction and prison term on the other. The arrestee instead has a limited right
to self-defense. He can respond to the deputy· s use of excessi\ e force with a reasonable amount
of force. This Court should therefore hold that an arrestee has the right to de rend himself against
excessive force during the booking process. vacate Mr. Garner·s battery con\'iction, and remand
this case to the district court for a ne\V trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
If an error was follov,ed by a contemporaneous objection at trial. and the appellant shows

that a violation occurred, the burden shifts to the State to prove the error was harmless beyond a

6 Although Mr. Garner contends his status within the criminal justice system does not affect the
outcome of this case, he refers to himself as an "arrestee" for clarity's sake. See Aldini v.
Johnson, 609 F.3d 858,866 (6th Cir. 2010) (.. The Court noted in dicta in Wolfish that individuals
who have not had a probable-cause hearing are not yet pretrial detainees for constitutional
purposes.") (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 440 U.S. 520. 536 (1979)).

7

reasonable doubt. State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010); see also Chapman v. California,

u

18 (1967).

This requires the

to

beyond a reasonable doubt, "that

constitutional violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict.,. Perry, 150 Idaho at
"Whether a jury has been properly instructed is a question of law O\er which this Court
exercises free review.'· State v. Pearce. 146 Idaho 241. 247 (2008). To determine whether a
defendant's requested instruction should have been given, the appellate court .. must examine the
instructions that were given and the evidence that was adduced at trial."
1 12 Idaho 873, 881 (1987).

This Court also exercises ·'free revie\V

0\

determination of \\hether due process standards have been satisfied.''

State v. Johns,

er the trial court's

State

i·

Schevers.

132 Idaho 786, 788 (Ct. App. 1999).

C.

The District Court Committed Reversible Error Bv Rejecting Mr. Garner's Self-Defense
Instruction
"A defendant is entitled to an instruction where 'there is a reasonable view of the

evidence presented in the case that ·would support' the theory" articulated in the proposed
instruction.

Pearce, 146 Idaho at 247-48 (2008) (quoting Store v. Eastman. 122 Idaho 87. 90

( 1992)). When a reasonable view of the evidence supports the instruction requested, the subject
matter of the proposed instruction is not

CO\

ered elsewhere in the instructions, and the proposed

instruction does not improperly comment on the evidence
governing law must be given:' State

V.

the "requested instruction on

Fe!lerzr. 126 Idaho 475. 476-77 (Ct. App. 1994). "If the

foregoing criteria are met, but the requested instruction incorrectly states the lavv, the trial court
is ·under the affirmative duty to properly instruct the jury."' Id (quoting Eastman, 122 Idaho 87,
91 (1992)). Erroneous instructions amount to reversible error if "the instructions as a whole
misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011 ).

8

Mr. Garner's theory of the case regarding the battery charge was that. to the extent that he
a battery, he

selt:defense. A reasonable

of the e\ idence presented at

supports that theory. After Mr. Garner allegedly spit at one

the deputies during intake,

the deputies took Mr. Garner to the ground. (Tr. Vol. II, p.22, L.4

p.23, L 19, p.25, Ls.13-22.)

Four deputies tried to control Mr. Garner, who was on his stomach on a cement slab with his
hands cuffed behind his back. (Tr. Vol. II, p.28. Ls.13-14). Deputies Huffaker and Johnson held
Mr. Garner's legs (Tr. Vol.

IL

p.29, Ls.1-24, p.31, Ls.5-7), Deputy Burnett was trying to control

Mr. Gamer's head (Tr. Vol. II, p.27, Ls.19-23), and Deputy McKinley \Vas on Mr. Gamer's
upper body (Tr. Vol. II, p.30, Ls.20-24. p.73 L.11

p.74, 1 8). (See also Tr. Vol. I, p.284,

Ls.19-22 (Deputy Burnett ans\vering ')cs .. when asked "[s]o hands behind his back and his
body is prone on the floor and there is [sic] at least three officers on top of him at that time,
correct?''); Tr. Vol. II, p.73. Ls.2-5 (Deputy Huffaker testifying that Deputy Burnett was putting
pn:ssure on l'vfr. Gamer's shoulder blades).)
Around that time, Deputy Lusby heard \Ir. Garner making .. guttural-type noises" and say
things like "I can't breathe ... and --get your hands off me" (Tr. Vol. 1, p.446. Ls.8-15), and
Deputy Burnett heard Mr. Garner say "·[g]et off my fucking back'' (Tr. Vol. I, p.189, Ls.20-22).
Mr. Garner then kicked out of the leg lock and hit Deputy Huffaker. (Tr. Vol. L p.360, Ls.10-12
(Deputy McKinley testifying that Mr. Garner '·kicked out of [the leg lock]. And in the process of
kicking out, he kicked [Deputy Huffaker] in the stomach and moved him back."); Tr. Vol. II.,
p.35, L.5 - p.36. L.4) (Deputy Huffaker testifying that Mr. Garner was "starting to kick out of
the leg-lock," "was bucking his body, kind of using his upper body pushing oft~ using his legs,
and pushing [Deputy Huffaker] with his feet.'' and kicked Deputy Huffaker).) Although the
district court did not squarely address the issue. it appears that the court found that the testimony
provided a factual basis for Mr. Garner's selt:Jefense instruction. (Tr. Vol. II, p.130, Ls.6-20
9

did recall hearing some testimony on that issue. Not much. but again, I did recall hearing at
some testimony.
Instead, the court

instruction because it concluded that there

to give

vvas no legal basis for self-defense under these circumstances. (Tr. Vol. II, p.131, L.25

p.134,

L.12.) Specifically, the court rejected Mr. Garner's proposed instruction because it believed a
defendant could only assert self-defense against excessive force used by peace officers, not
detention officers, in situations in which the officer used excessive force during an arrest, not
after the defendant \Vas already arrested. (Tr. Vol. II. p.132. L. l

p.134, L.12.) The court based

its conclusion on ICJI 1263 and Spurr. without ever really addressing defense counsel's
argument that the right of self-defense is grounded in the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. (Id)
The court erred in several respects. As an initial matter. model jury instructions are not
the lmv, and the court must modify such instructions, or create completely new instructions, in
order to communicate the applicable law to the jury.

See Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions,

Introduction and General Directions for Use 7; see also Tr. Vol. I. p.21

Ls.l-25. What's more,

the Court never squarely addressed defense counsel's argument that the U.S. and Idaho
Constitutions give a person the right to defend himself against a government officer's use of
excessive force, and that right does not disappear depending on the person ·s status within the
criminal justice system or the title of the officer using excessiw force. Because Mr. Garner had

7

According to the Introduction and General Directions For Use:
[T]he law prevailing during the period of drafting is reflected in the instructions.
As the law in any respect becomes more refined or is modified by statute or
appellate decision, the IC.JI instructions must be modified accordingly.
In addition, judges and lawyers should note that these instructions cannot
possibly cover all of the legal issues on which a jury may need guidance in a
particular case .... A trial judge should remain vigilant in observing the duty set
forth in Idaho Code § 19-2132: "In charging the jury, the court must state to
them all matters of law necessary for their information.''
Id. at p. l, available at https://www.isc.idaho.gov/main/criminal-jury-instructions.
10

a right to use reasonable force against the deputies' use of excessive force, the district court erred
refusing to give his proposed instruction.
to present a complete defense and so the

error

Mr.

constitutional right

cannot pro\e that it did not contribute to the jury's

verdict. The error requires reversal.

I.

An Arrestee Has The Right To Defend Himself Against A Detention Deputy's
Use Of Excessive Force

The U.S. Supreme Court and Idaho courts have long recognized an individual's right to
defend himself against another's use of force. ,'-,ee. e.g., Beard v. United Swtes, 158 U.S. 550
( 1895 ); State v. 1vfcGreevey, 17 Idaho 453 ( 1909). Although this right is reaffirmed in statute,
J.C.§§ 19-201, 19-202, 19-202A 8 the right undoubtedly predated the statutory right, and is

rooted in the U.S. Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, and common law. See, e.g., Beard, 158
U.S. at 561-64; Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846. 852 (6th Cir. 2002), ID. CONST., art. L § 1
(''All men are by nature free and equaL and have certain inalienable rights. among which arc
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; pursuing
happiness and securing safety."). As the Sixth Circuit in Taylor v. Winthrow explained:
The right to
Blackstone referred to
it is not, neither can it
him, the common law

claim self-defense is deeply rooted in our traditions.
self-defense as the primary law of nature, and claimed that
be in fact, taken avvay by the lav, of society. According to
held self-defense an excuse for breaches of the peace, nay

8

The Idaho Code outlines self-defense generally, without limiting the circumstances under
which an individual can claim self-defense. --Lawful resistance to the commission of a public
offense may be made: 1. By the party about to be injured. 2. By other parties." I.C. § 19-201.
"Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party about to be injured: 1. To
prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof. 2. To prevent an
illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession." l.C. § 19-202. "No
person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting
himself or his family by reasonable means necessary, or when coming to the aid of another
whom he reasonably believes to be in imminent danger of or the victim of aggravated assault,
robbery, rape, murder or other heinous crime." I.C. § l 9-202A. The statute governing the use
of force to make an arrest, I.C. § 19-610, similarly does not speak to the use of force after the
point that an arrest is made.
11

even for homicide itself. Even f-gelhoff: 9 a case taking a decidedly narrow view
of which rights are "fundamental," the Court commented that the right to have the
jury consider self-defense evidence may be a fundamental right. We know of no
the past has barred a criminal defendant from
state that either currently or
putting fonvard self-defense as a defense \Vhen supported by the evidence.

Id at 852 (internal citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted; footnote added).
In the context of arrestees, pretrial detainees, and inmates, the line between this right of
self-defense and the corollary right to be free from a government actor's use of excessive force is
some·what blurred. See Spurr, 114 Idaho at 279 (.. A person has a constitutional right not to be
subjected to excessive force by la\v enforcement officers in the performance of their duties.
Furthermore, a defendant has a right to defend himself against the use of excessive force by an
officer.") (internal citations omitted); United :-,'tales v. Gore, 592 F.3d 489, 491-92 (4th Cir.
2010) (in which the government conceded that ·'[ s Jome minimal right of self-defense must be
available to inmates charged [with assaulting. resisting, or impeding certain officers or
employees] under 18 U.S.C. § 111 because disabling an inmate entirely from protecting himself .
. . would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.");
see also Tr. Vol. IL p.124, L.18

125, L.18. Like 42 U.S.C.

1983 cases alleging an otlicer's

use of excessive force, the source of the right to self-defense \Vi thin the U.

Constitution mav

vary depending on when the force is used. Crnham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 386, 388 ( l 989) (the
Fourth Amendment applies to excessive force used during seizures), Whirley v. Alhers, 4 75 U.S.
312, 320-21 (1986) (the Eight Amendment applies to excessive force used after conviction);
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466. 2475-76 (2015) (approving of an excessive force
claim brought by a pretrial detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
Regardless of its origins, the right of self-defense does not evaporate if the individual
acting in self-defense is an arrestee, detainee, or inmate.

9

Instead, the right is modified.

Jvfontana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 55-56 ( 1996) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
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Gore, 592 F.3d at 495 (holding that .. a prisoner charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C.
111 must. to succeed on

affirmative

self-defense, demonstrate that he responded

to an unlawful and present threat of death or

bodily injury.

v. Bradley, 10 P.3d

358, 358 (Wash. 2000), (analogizing to the arrest context to hold that an inmate "may claim selfdefense and use force to resist only when that [inmate] is in actuaL imminent danger of serious
injury."): Com. v. F'rancis, 511 N.E.2d 38. 40 (Mass.Ct. App. 1987) ('·The right of an individual
to defend himself is modified where a police or correction officer is involved.

Even in

circumstances vvhere the defendant would be justified in using force in lawful defense of his
person against a third person, he may not do so against a police or correction officer unless the
officer uses excessive or unnecessary force.

State v. Bojon1uez, 675 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Ariz.

1984) (analogizing to S'tate v. Afartinez, 596 P.2d 734 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). which held that an
arrestee has right to self-defense against a police officer's use of excessive force during arrest, to
find that an inmate has the right to defend himself against a prison ofiicial"s use of excessive
force).)
Therefore, the court should have instructed the jury that, if the detention deputies used
unreasonable or excessive force, Mr. Garner could use reasonable force to protect himself.

See ICJI 1263. This instruction accurately states the law. is supported by the facts, and is not
covered by any other instruction. (See R., pp.95-133; Tr.. Vol. II, p.148, L.14

p.160, L.10.)

The court erred by refusing to give the self-defense instruction.

2.

The District Court's Error Violated Mr. Garner's Constitutional Right To Present
A Complete Defense And Thus Requires Reversal

The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to present a complete defense.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967); Cal(fornia v. Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479, 485
(I 984); see also ID. CONST., art. I, § 13 (.. No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or

13

property without due process of law.").

necessary corollary . . is the rule that a defendant in

trial has the right, under appropriate circumstances. to have
or

defense,

the right to present a

J

instructed on

s

would be meaningless were a trial court

completely free to ignore that defense when giving instructions.'· Taylor. 288 F.3d at 851-52.
Further, "[a]n erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an element of a
charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process, or as a violation of the
Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee." State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012)
(internal citations omitted). When the defendant has been denied a fair opportunity to defend
against the charge, his conviction must be overturned. 5,;tate

1·.

Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 676

(Ct. App. 2003) (overruled on other grounds as recognized by State v. Ga/ran, 156 Idaho 3 79,
383 (Ct. App. 2014)): see also Perry, 150 Idaho at 227 (the appellate court will reverse and
remand unless the State proves '·that the constitutional violatinn did not contribute to the jury's
verdict." ); Draper, 151 Idaho at 5 88 (an erroneous instruction constitutes reversible error "if the
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party").
As explained above, a reasonable \ iev, of the evidence supports Mr Garner's requested
instruction and the instruction accurately states the law.

By refusing to instruct the jury

regarding Mr. Garner's defense, the district court denied him a fair opportunity to defend against
the battery charge. See Washington, 388 U.S. at 17-19; U.S. CONST., amend. VI; ID. CONST.,
art. I, § 13. Indeed, the court relieved the State of its burden to prove both the elements of the
battery charge and that Mr. Garner was not acting in self-defense. See I.C §§ 18-915(2), 18903 (defining battery as the unlawful use of force, an unlaivful touching or striking, or

unlawfully causing bodily harm); ICJI 1263. That error cannot be harmless.
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CONCLUSION
Garner respectfully requests that

Court vacate his battery conviction and remand

to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 24 th day of September, 2015.
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YA.WALDRON

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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